**THE AUTO-ETHNOGRAPHY THAT CAN NEVER BE AND THE ACTIVIST ETHNOGRAPHY THAT MIGHT BE**

**by David Graeber**

 My first reaction when asked to contribute to this volume is that an auto-ethnography of anthropology would simply be impossible.

 My logic was this. During the '80s, we all became used to the idea of reflexive anthropology, the effort to probe behind the apparent authority of ethnographic texts to reveal the complex relations of power and domination that went into making them. The result was an outpouring of ethnographic meditations on the politics of fieldwork. But even as a graduate student, it always seemed to me there was something oddly missing here. Ethnographic texts, after all, are not actually written in the field. They are written at universities. Reflexive anthropology, however, almost never had anything to say about the power relations under which these texts were actually composed. In retrospect the reason seems simple enough: when one is in the field, all the power is one side—or at least, could easily be imagined as being so. To meditate on one's own power is not going to offend anyone (in fact, it's something of a classic upper middle class preoccupation), and even if it does, there's likely to be nothing those who are offended by your representations of them can to do about it. The moment one returns from the field and begins writing, however, the power relations are reversed. While one is writing one's dissertation, one is, typically, a penniless graduate student, whose entire career could very possibly be destroyed by one impolitic interaction with a committee member. While one is transforming the dissertation into a book, one is typically an adjunct or untenured Assistant Professor, desperately trying not to step on any powerful toes and land a real permanent job. Any anthropologist in such a situation will, in fact, mostly likely spend many hours developing complex, nuanced, and extremely detailed ethnographic analyses of the power relations this entails, but that critique can never, by definition, be published, because anyone who did so would be committing academic suicide. One can only imagine the fate of, say, a female grad student who wrote an essay documenting the sexual politics of her department, let alone the sexual overtures of her committee members, or, say, one of working class background who published an description of the practices of Marxist professors who regularly cite Pierre Bourdieu's analyses of the reproduction of class privilege in academic settings, and then in their actually lives act as if Bourdieu had been writing a how-to book instead of a critique. By the time one is a senior faculty member, absolutely secure in one's position, one might be able to get away with publishing such an analysis. But by then—unless one is reminiscing—one's very situation of power guarantees the object can no longer be perceived.

 My conclusion was that it would be safer to admit to being an anarchist than to write an honest auto-ethnography of the academy.

 On the other hand, I am an anarchist. And it strikes me the dilemmas that have come out of that provide an interesting commentary on the academy in themselves.

**consensus and direct democracy**

 I conducted my doctoral research in a rural community in Madagascar, during a period in which most of the countryside there had been largely abandoned by the state. Rural communities, and even to some degree towns, were to a large degree self-governing; no one was really paying taxes; if a crime was committed, the police would not come. Public decisions, when they had to be made, tended to be made by a

kind of informal consensus process. I wrote a little bit about the latter in my dissertation but, like most anthropologists, I couldn't think of all that much interesting to say about it.

 In fact I only real came to understand what was interesting about consensus retrospectively, ten years later, when I became an activist in New York. Almost all North American anarchist groups operate by some form of consensus process, and the process works so well—it really seems about the only form of decision-making fully consistent with non-top-down styles of organization—that it has been widely adopted by anyone interested in direct democracy. There's enormous variation among different styles and forms of consensus but one thing almost all the North American variants have in common is that they are organized in conscious opposition to the style of organization and, especially, of debate typical of the classical sectarian Marxist group. Where the latter are invariably organized around some Master Theoretician, who offers a comprehensive analysis of the world situation and, usually, of human history as a whole, but very little theoretical reflection on more immediate questions of organization and practice, anarchist-inspired groups tend to operate on the assumption that no one could, or probably should, ever convert another person completely to one's own point of view, that decision-making structures are ways of managing diversity, and therefore, that one should concentrate instead on maintaining egalitarian process and considering immediate questions of action in the present. One of the fundamental principles of political debate, for instance, is that one is obliged to give other participants the benefit of the doubt for honesty and good intentions, whatever else one might think of their arguments. In part too this emerges from the style of debate consensus decision-making encourages: where voting encourages one to reduce one's opponents positions to a hostile caricature, or whatever it takes to defeat them, a consensus process is built on a principle of compromise and creativity where one is constantly changing proposals around until one can come up with something everyone can at least live with; therefore, the incentive is always to put the best possible construction on other's arguments.

 All this was very much like what I'd witnessed in Madagascar; the main difference was that since American activists were learning all this from scratch, it all had to be spelled out explicitly. So the activist experience did throw some new light on my original ethnography: I came to wonder, for instance, whether it was the very need to constantly put the best construction on others' intentions in public which led to the obsession, so often seen in egalitarian societies, with secret evil motives and magical powers. But the main way it struck me was to bring home to me just how much ordinary intellectual practice—the kind of thing I was trained to do at the University of Chicago, for example—really does resemble just the sort of sectarian modes of debate anarchists were so trying to avoid. One of the things which had most disturbed me about my training there was precisely the way we were encouraged to read other theorists' arguments: basically, in the least charitable way possible. I had sometimes wondered how this could be reconciled with an idea that intellectual practice was, on some ultimate level, a common enterprise in pursuit of truth. In fact, academic discourse often seems an almost an almost exact reproduction of style of intellectual debate typical of the most ridiculous vanguardist sects. I ended up compiling a kind of checklist:

 1) the tendency, if there were two ways to read a sentence written by someone with a point of view differing from one's own, one of which assumes the author had at least a iota of common sense, to always to choose the other one.

 2) the tendency to walk around carrying in one's head a kind of lists of "32 different ways to be wrong" and to listen to points of view differing from one's own only so long as it takes to figure out which variety of wrongness to plug them into. We have probably all had the experience of having someone explaining to us, in detail, what *we* think: "You like coops? You are a cooperativist. You believe that X and Y and Z. But you are wrong because cooperativism utopian and reformist.... You like clarity? You are a Habermassian..."

 3) the tendency to treat often minor intellectual differences not only as tokens of belonging to some imagined "ism" but as profound moral flaws: one is thus revealed to be racist, or sexist, or bourgeois, or something similarly execrable.

**anarchism and the academy**

 All this helped explain something else: why there are so few anarchists in the academy. As a political philosophy, anarchism is going through a veritable renaissance. Anarchist principles——autonomy, voluntary association, self-organization, direct democracy, mutual aid—have become the basis for organizing of new social movements from Karnataka to Buenos Aires, even if their exponents are as likely to actually call themselves Autonomists, Associationalists, Horizontalists, or Zapatistas. Yet most academics seem to have only the vaguest idea any of this is happening, and tend to still be at the stage of dismissing the very idea of anarchism with stupid jokes ("anarchist organization! but isn't that a contradiction in terms?"), if, indeed, they are even aware of its existence. There are still thousands of academic Marxists and no more than three or four well known academic anarchists.

 I don't think this is because academics are slow on the ball. It seems to me that Marxism has always had an affinity with the academy that anarchism never could. It was, after all was invented by a Ph.D.; and there's always been something about its spirit which fits that of the academy. Anarchism on the other hand was never really invented by anyone. True, historians usually treat it as if it were, constructing the history of anarchism as if it's basically a creature identical in its nature to Marxism: it was created by specific 19th century thinkers, perhaps Godwin or Stirner, but definitely Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, it inspired working-class organizations, became enmeshed in political struggles... But in fact the analogy is strained. First of all, the 19th century generally credited with inventing anarchism didn't think of themselves as having invented anything particularly new. Bakunin no more so himself as an inventor of freedom than Kropotkin thought he had invented mutual aid. Similarly, the rejection of the state and of all forms of structural violence, inequality, or domination (anarchism literally means "without rulers"), even the assumption that all these forms are somehow related and reinforce each other, was hardly some startlingly new 19th century doctrine. One can find evidence of people making similar arguments throughout history, despite the fact there is every reason to believe that such opinions were the ones least likely to be written down. We are talking less about a body of theory than about an attitude, or perhaps a faith: a rejection of certain types of social relation, a confidence that certain others are a much better ones on which to build a decent or humane society, a faith that it would be possible to do so.

 One need only compare the historical schools of Marxism, and anarchism, then, to see we are dealing with a fundamentally different sort of thing. Marxist schools have authors. Just as Marxism sprang from the mind of Marx, so we have Leninists, Maoists, Trotksyites, Gramscians, Althusserians... Note how the list starts with heads of state and grades almost seamlessly into French professors. Pierre Bourdieu once noted that, if the academic field is a game in which scholars strive for

dominance, then you know you have won when other scholars start wondering how to make an adjective out of your name. It is, presumably, to preserve the possibility of winning the game that intellectuals insist, in discussing each other, on continuing to employ just the sort of Great Man theories of history they would scoff at in discussing just about anything else: Foucault's ideas, like Trotsky's, are never treated as primarily the products of a certain intellectual milieu, as something that emerging from endless conversations and arguments in cafes, classrooms, etc, but always, as if they emerged from a single man's genius. Here, too, Marxism seems entirely within the spirit of the academy.

 Schools of anarchism, in contrast, emerge from some kind of organizational principle or form of practice: Anarcho-Syndicalists and Anarcho-Communists, Insurrectionists and Platformists, Cooperativists, Individualists, and so on. (Significantly, those Marxist tendencies which are not named after individuals, like Autonomism or Council Communism, are themselves the closest to anarchism.) Anarchists are distinguished by what they do, and how they organize themselves to go about doing it. And indeed this has always been what anarchists have spent most of their time thinking and arguing about. They have never been much interested in the kinds of broad strategic or philosophical questions that preoccupy Marxists such as Are the peasants a potentially revolutionary class? (anarchists tend to think this something for peasants to decide) or what is the nature of the commodity form? Rather, they tend to argue about what is the truly democratic way to go about a meeting, at what point organization stops being empowering people and starts squelching individual freedom. Is "leadership" necessarily a bad thing? Or, alternately, about the ethics of opposing power: What is direct action? Should one condemn someone who assassinates a head of state? When is it okay to break a window?

 Marxism, then has tended to be a theoretical or analytical discourse about revolutionary strategy. Anarchism has tended to be an ethical discourse about revolutionary practice.

 Now, this does imply there's a lot of potential complementary between the two. There is no reason one couldn't write Marxist theory, and simultaneously engage in anarchist practice; in fact, a lot of people have, including me.[[1]](#footnote-2) But if anarchism is an ethics of practice, it means nothing to say you are an anarchist unless you are doing something. And if it is a form of ethics that insists, before anything else, that one's means most be consonant with one's ends; one cannot create freedom through authoritarian means; that as much as possible, one must embody the society one wishes to create, then it's very difficult to imagine how one could do this in a university without getting in serious trouble.

 When I asked Immanuel Wallerstein why he thought academics engaged in such sectarian styles of debate he acted as if the answer was obvious: "the academy is a perfect feudalism." In fact, the modern university system is about the only institution—other than the British monarchy and Catholic church—to have survived

more or less intact from the High Middle Ages.[[2]](#footnote-3) What would it actually mean to act like an anarchist in an environment full of deans and provosts and people wearing funny robes, conference hopping in luxurious hotels, doing intellectual battle in language so arcane that no one who hasn't spent at least two or three years in grad school would ever hope to be able to understand it? At the very least it would mean challenging the University structure in some way. So we are back to the problem with which I began. To act like an anarchist would be academic suicide. So it is not at all clear what an anarchist academic could actually *do*.

**revolutionaries and the university**

 If one were to follow Wallerstein's lead, it would no doubt be possible to write a history of academic sectarianism, starting perhaps with the theological quarrels between Dominicans and Franciscans in the 13th century—that is, back when the quarrels were literally between rival sects—and tracing it down to the origins of the modern University system in Prussia in the early 19th century. As Randall Collins has pointed out, the reformers who created the modern University system, mainly by putting philosophy in the place formerly held by theology as master discipline, and tying the institution to a newly centralizing state, were almost all exponents of one or another form of Idealism. His argument seems a trifle cynical, but the pattern was repeated in so many countries—first Germany, then England, the United States, Italy, Scandinavia, Japan—that it's difficult to discount:

When Kant proposed to make the philosophy faculty arbiter of the other disciplines, he was carrying out a line which made academic careers in themselves superior to careers within the church... When Fichte envisioned university professors as a new species of philosopher-king, he was putting in the most flamboyant form the tendency for academic degree holders to monopolize entry into government administration. The basis for these arguments had to be worked out in the concepts of philosophical discourse; but the motivation for creating these concepts came from the realistic assessment that the structure was moving in a direction favorable to a self-governing intellectual elite (p650)

If so, it explains why followers of Marx, that great rebel against German Idealism, can form such a perfect complement to the spirit of the academy—it's mirror image, even—even while serving as a bridge through which habits of argument once typical of theologians can get carried over into domains of politics.

 Some would argue (I think Collins would) that these sectarian divisions are simply inevitable features of intellectual life. New ideas can only emerge from a welter of contending schools. This may be true; but I think it rather misses the point. First of all, the sort of consensus-based groups I was describing earlier put a premium on diversity of perspectives too; they just don't see discussions as a contest which one theory or perspective should, ultimately, win. That's why discussion always focuses on what people are going to do. Second, sectarian modes of debate are hardly conducive to fostering intellectual creativity. It's hard to see how a strategy of systematically misrepresenting other scholars' arguments could actually contribute to the furtherance of human knowledge. It is useful, only, if one sees oneself as fighting a battle and the only object is to win. One uses such techniques to impress an audience. Of course, in academic battles, often there is no audience—other than one's

grad students or other feudal retainers—which makes it all seem rather pointless, but it doesn't seem to phase anyone; academic warriors will play to non-existent audiences in the same way that minuscule Trotskyite sects of seven or eight members will invariably pretend to be governments in waiting, and thus feel it is their responsibility to lay out their positions on everything from gay marriage to how best to resolve ethnic tensions in Kashmir. It might seem ridiculous. Actually, it is ridiculous. But apparently, it is the best way to guarantee victory in those odd feudal tournaments that have become the hallmark of Collin's "self-governing intellectual elite".

**on the idea of the avant garde**

 I seem to have argued myself into something of a box here. Anarchists overcome sectarian habits by always keeping the focus on anarchists have in common, whic is what they want to *do*; what academics want to do, for the most part, is to establish their relative position.

 Perhaps it might be best to take it, then, from the other side.

 Anarchists have a word for this sort of behavior. They call it "vanguardism". In revolutionary circles, this sort of sectarian behavior is typical of those who believe that the proper role of intellectuals is to come up with the correct theoretical analysis of the world situation, so as to be able to lead the masses on a truly revolutionary path. One salutory effect of the popularity of anarchism within revolutionary circles nowadays is that this position is considered definitively passé. The problem is what, then, to role of revolutionary intellectuals is in fact to be. So another way to pose the question is: how can we get past our vanguardist habits?

 Untwining social theory from vanguardist habits might seem a particularly difficult task because historically, modern social theory and the idea of the vanguard were born more or less together. Actually, so was the idea of an artistic avant garde ("avant garde" is in fact simply the same word in French), and the relation between the three suggests some unexpected possibilities.

 The term avant garde was actually coined by Henri de Saint-Simon, the product of a series of essays he wrote at the very end of his life. Like his onetime secretary and disciple (and later bitter rival) Auguste Comte, Saint-Simon was writing in the wake of the French revolution and essentially, were asking what had gone wrong: why the transition from a medieval, feudal Catholic society to a modern, industrial democratic one seemed to be creating such enormous violence and social dislocation. The problem, he concluded, was that while science had replaced religion as our way of interpreting the world, science had no priesthood; modern society lacked any force of ideological cohesion that could play the same role as the Medieval church. Each ended up proposing a new religion: Saint-Simon's called his the "New Christianity", Comte, the "New Catholicism". In the first, artists were to play the role of the priesthood; St. Simon produced an imaginary dialogue in which a representative of the artists explains to the scientists how, in their role of imagining possible futures and inspiring the public, they will play the role of an "avant garde", a "truly priestly function" in the coming society; eventually, artists will hatch the visions that scientists and industrialists will put into effect. Saint-Simon was also perhaps the first to conceive the notion of the withering away of the state: once it had become clear that the authorities were operating for the good of the public, one would no more need force to compel the public to heed their advice than one needed it to compel patients to take the advice of their doctors. Government would pass away into at most some minor police functions.

 Comte, of course, is most famous as the founder of sociology; he invented the term to describe what he saw as the master-discipline which could both understand and direct society. He ended up taking a different, far more authoritarian approach: ultimately proposing the regulation and control of almost all aspects of human life

according to scientific principles, with the priestly role[[3]](#footnote-4) in his New Catholicism being played by the sociologists themselves.

 It's a particularly fascinating opposition because in the early twentieth century, the positions were effectively reversed. Instead of the left-wing Saint-Simonians looking to artists for leadership, while the right-wing Comtians fancied themselves scientists, we had the fascist leaders like Hitler and Mussolini who imagined themselves as great artists inspiring the masses, and sculpting society according to their grandiose imaginings, and the Marxist vanguard claiming the role of scientists.

 The Saint Simonians at any rate actively sought to recruit artists for their various ventures, salons, and utopian communities; though they quickly ran into difficulties because so many within "avant garde" artistic circles preferred the more anarchistic Fourierists, and later, one or another branch of outright anarchists. Actually, the number of 19th century artists with anarchist sympathies is quite staggering, ranging from Pissaro to Tolstoy or Oscar Wilde, not to mention almost all early 20th century artists who later became Communists, from Malevich to Picasso. Rather than a political vanguard leading the way to a future society, radical artists almost invariably saw themselves as exploring new and less alienated modes of life. The really significant development in the 19th century was less to idea of a vanguard than that of Bohemia (a term first coined by Balzac in 1838): marginal communities living in more or less voluntary poverty, seeing themselves as dedicated to the pursuit of creative, unalienated forms of experience, united by a profound hatred of bourgeois life and everything it stood for. Ideologically, they were about equally likely to be proponents of "art for art's sake" or social revolutionaries. And in fact they seem to have been drawn from almost precisely the same social conjuncture as most modern revolutionaries (or current activist circles for that matter): a kind of meeting between certain elements of (intentionally) downwardly mobile professional classes, in broad rejection of bourgeois values, and upwardly mobile children of the working class—the sort who managed to get themselves a bourgeois level of education only to discover this didn't mean actual entry into the bourgeoisie.[[4]](#footnote-5)

 In the 19th century idea of the political vanguard was used very widely and very loosely for anyone seen as exploring the path to a future, free society. Radical newspapers for example often called themselves "the Avant Garde". It was Marx though who began to significantly change the idea by introducing the notion that

the proletariat were the true revolutionary class—he didn't actually use the term "vanguard" in his own writing—because they were the one that was the most oppressed, or as he put it "negated" by capitalism, and therefore had the least to lose by its abolition. In doing so, he ruled out the possibility that less alienated enclaves, whether of artists or the sort of artisans and independent producers who tended to form the backbone of anarchism, had anything significant to offer. The results we all know. The idea of a vanguard party to dedicated to both organizing and providing an intellectual project for that most-oppressed class chosen as the agent of history, but also, actually sparking the revolution through their willingness to employ violence, was first outlined by Lenin in 1902 in What Is to Be Done?; it has echoed endlessly, to the point where the SDS in the late '60s could end up locked in furious debates over whether the Black Panther Party should be considered the vanguard of The Movement as the leaders of its most oppressed element. All this in turn had a curious effect on the artistic avant garde who increasingly started to organize themselves like vanguard parties, beginning with the Dadaists and Futurists, publishing their own manifestos, communiqués, purging one another, and otherwise making themselves (sometimes quite intentional) parodies of revolutionary sects. (Note however that these groups always defined themselves, like anarchists, by a certain form of practice rather than after some heroic founder.) The ultimate fusion came with the Surrealists and then finally the Situationist International, which on the one hand was the most systematic in trying to develop a theory of revolutionary action according to the spirit of Bohemia, thinking about what it might actually mean to destroy the boundaries between art and life, but at the same time, in its own internal organization, displayed a kind of insane sectarianism full of so many splits, purges, and bitter denunciations that Guy Debord finally remarked that the only logical conclusion was for the International to be finally reduced to two members, one of whom would purge the other and then commit suicide. (Which is actually not too far from what actually ended up happening.)

**NON-ALIENATED PRODUCTION**

 T historical relations between political and artistic avant gardes have been explored at length by others. For me though the really intriguing questions is: why is it that artists have so often been so drawn to revolutionary politics to begin with? Because it does seem to be the case that, even in times and places when there is next to no other constituency for revolutionary change, the one place on is most likely to find one is among artists, authors, and musicians; even more so, in fact, that among professional intellectuals. It seems to me the answer must have something to do with alienation. There would appear to be a direct link between the experience of first imagining things and then bringing them into being (individually or collectively)—that is, the experience of certain forms of unalienated production—and the ability to imagine social alternatives; particularly, the possibility of a society itself premised on less alienated forms of creativity. Which would allow us to see the historical shift between seeing the vanguard as the relatively unalienated artists (or perhaps intellectuals) to seeing them as the representatives of the "most oppressed" in a new light. In fact, I would suggest, revolutionary coalitions always tend to consist of an alliance between a society's least alienated and its most oppressed. And this is less elitist a formulation than it might sound, because it also seems to be the case that actual revolutions tend to occur when these two categories come to overlap. That would at any rate explain why it almost always seems to be peasants and craftspeople - or alternately, newly proletarianized former peasants and craftspeople - who actually rise up and overthrow capitalist regimes, and not those inured to generations of wage labor. Finally, I suspect this would also help explain the extraordinary importance of indigenous people's struggles in that planetary uprising usually referred to as the "anti-globalization" movement: such people tend to be simultaneously the very least alienated and most oppressed people on earth, and once it is technologically possible to include them in revolutionary coalitions, it is almost inevitable that they should take a leading role.

 The role of indigenous peoples, curiously, leads us back to the role of ethnography. Now, it seems to me that in political terms, ethnography has received a somewhat raw deal. It is assumed to be intrinsically the sort of thing used as a tool of domination, or at least administration, by colonial governments and foreign conquerors. In fact, as I've argued elsewhere (Graeber 2001:XXX), the use of ethnography by European colonial governments is something of an anomaly: in the ancient world, for example, one sees a burst of ethnographic curiosity in the time of Herodotus which vanishes the moment gigantic multi-cultural empires come on the scene. Really, periods of great ethnographic curiosity have tended to be periods of rapid social change and at least potential revolution. What's more, one could argue that under normal conditions, ethnography is less likely to employed by the powerful than as a weapon of the weak. All those grad students constructing elaborate ethnographies of their departments that they can never publish are really doing, perhaps in a more theoretically informed way, something that everyone in such a position tends to do. Servants, hirelings, slaves, secretaries, concubines, kitchen workers, pretty much anyone dependent on the whims of a person or persons living in a different moral or cultural universe are for obvious reasons constantly trying to figure out what that person is thinking, how people like that tend to think. The opposite rarely happens.[[5]](#footnote-6)

 Of course, ethnography is ideally, a lot more than that. Ideally, ethnography is about teasing out the hidden symbolic, moral, or pragmatic logics that underly certain types of social action; the way people's habits and actions makes sense in ways that they are not themselves completely aware of. But it seems to me this provides a potential role for the radical, non-vanguardist intellectual. The first thing we need to do is to look at those who are creating viable alternatives on the group, and try to figure out what might be the larger implications of what they are (already) doing.

 Obviously what I am proposing would only work if it was, ultimately, a form of auto-ethnography—in the sense of examining movements to which one has, in fact, made some kind of commitment, in which one feels oneself a part. It would also have to combined with a certain utopian extrapolation: a matter of teasing out the tacit logic or principles underlying certain forms of radical practice, and then, not only offering the analysis back to those communities, but using them to formulate new visions ("if one applied the same principles as you are applying to political organization to economics, might it not look something like this?"...) Here too there are suggestive parallels in the history of radical artistic movements, which became movements precisely as they became their own critics (and of course the idea of self-criticism took on a very different, and more ominous, tone within Marxist politics); there are also intellectuals already trying to do precisely this sort of auto-ethnographic work. But I say all this not so much to provide models as to open up a field for discussion, first of all, by emphasizing that even the notion of vanguardism itself far more rich in its history, and full of alternative possibilities, than most of us would ever be given to expect.

1. One might note that even Mikhail Bakunin, for all his endless battles with Marx over practical questions, also personally translated Marx's Capital into Russian. I also should point out that I am aware I am being a bit hypocritical here by indulging in some of the same sort of sectarian reasoning I'm otherwise critiquing: there are schools of Marxism which are far more open-minded and tolerant, and democratically organized, there are anarchist groups which are insanely sectarian; Bakunin himself was hardly a model for democracy by any standards, etc etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. I fact, Medieval historians inform me that at least in many parts of Europe, Medieval universities were actually more democratic than they are now, since students often elected the professors. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Effectively, the vanguard, though he did not actually call them this. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Contemporary theorists are actually quite divided over how to evaluate their larger significance. Pierre Bourdieu for example insisted that the promulgation of the idea of "art for art's sake", far from being depoliticizing, should be considered a significant accomplishment, as was any which managed to establish the autonomy of one particular field of human endeavor from the logic of the market. Colin Campbell on the other hand argues that insofar as bohemians actually were an avant garde, they were really the vanguard of the market itself, or more precisely, of consumerism: their actual social function, much though they would have loathed to admit it, was to explore new forms of pleasure or aesthetic territory which could be commoditized in the next generation. (One might call this the Tom Franks version of history.) Campbell also echoes common wisdom that bohemia was almost exclusively inhabited by the children of the bourgeoisie, who had—temporarily, at least—rejecting their families' money and privilege; and who, if they did not die young of dissipation, were likely to end up back on the board of father's company. This seems at the very least a gross simplification. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Take for example Todorov's famous essay on Cortes, who, he argue, was an amateur ethnographer who sought to understand the Aztecs in order to conquer them. It is rarely noted that Cortes tried to understand the Aztecs precisely as long as their army outnumbered his something like 100 to 1; the moment he defeated them, his ethnographic curiosity vanished. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)